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1. HOW AND WHY DID THE FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPEN?
Although we are now in a global credit and financial crisis, 2 we refer to its
earlier stages as a "subprime mortgage crisis." 3 However, the making and
monetization of subprime mortgages was not per se evil. Lenders made
* Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law Founding
Director, Duke Global Capitol Markets Center. I thank Professor Tom Plank and my colleague
Professor Bill Brown for helpful comments on this Essay. C 2009 by Steven L. Schwarcz.
1. This Keynote Address was delivered on October 24, 2008 at the South Carolina Law
Review Symposium entitled 1.9 Kids and a Foreclosure: Subprime Mortgages, the Credit Crisis,
and Restoring the American Dream. Parts of the Keynote Address derive from the author's
published and forthcoming articles. Steven L. Schwarcz, Complexity as a Catalyst of Market
Failure: A Law and Engineering Inquiry (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research
Paper No. 217, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-1240863
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Complexity]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The
Problem of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming Summer
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-1322536 [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Conflicts]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure]; Steven L. Schwarcz,
Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L. REV. 209 (2008)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Markets]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessonsfrom
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Protecting Financial Markets]; Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008)
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk].
2. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Three Trends and a Train Wreck, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at
B6 ("The crisis is global in nature and its causes are more general and less country-specific than is
commonly reflected in the political discourse of any single nation.").
3. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 373 n.1 ("The term 'subprime'
includes both loans to borrowers of dubious creditworthiness and very large loans to otherwise
creditworthy borrowers.").
4. But cf Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358 ("[The] chain
of securities and the information problems that arose [to cause the financial crisis] are unique to
subprime mortgages.").
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mortgage loans available to even risky borrowers, 5 but there were several
reasons why, besides greed: to some extent, lending to risky borrowers followed
a time-tested credit card model in which credit is made easily available and high
interest rates are charged in order, statistically, to offset losses. Furthermore,
mortgage lenders, unlike credit card lenders, have not only one way out-cash
flow-but also a second way out-collateral.
This model worked brilliantly so long as home prices appreciated, as they
had been doing for decades. The model also was consistent with the
government's strong encouragement of lenders to make mortgage loans to low
income-and often "disproportionately minority 7 -borrowers. 8 Enabling the
making of mortgage loans in many cases without documentation of borrower
income, the model also recognized, at least implicitly, that many seemingly low
income borrowers are actually paid on a cash basis, without officially declaring
their income. 9 Therefore, not completely unlike the argument by economist
Hernando de Soto that de facto property rights should be recognized in order to
enable the poor to borrow and acquire capital, 10 the model enabled de facto
income to be recognized, on a statistical basis, in order to enable the poor to
borrow money and acquire homes. 11
When home prices stopped appreciating, the model failed for those
borrowers who were relying on refinancing for loan repayment. Lenders often
made loans to risky borrowers under adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), with
the expectation that because of home appreciation, the mortgagor would be able
5. See, e.g., Mortimer Zuckerman, We Deserve a Better Bailout, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 20, 2008, at 80 ("[During the housing boom] [p]eople with no credit history and insufficient
income were enabled to buy homes with no money down-often at ridiculously high prices.").
6. Because collateral was the primary way out for some subprime loans, the statement in the
text above is more of a comparative assessment.
7. Gorton, supra note 4, at 3. See also id. at 5 ("Home ownership for low income and
minority households has been a long-standing national goal.").
8. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 5 ("in the early days ofthe housing boom, members of
Congress won votes by pressing for 'affordable housing' for everyone.").
9. Gorton, supra note 4, at 6 (observing that because the poor often engage in a cash
economy, many poor people "'are earning income but cannot prove it in the way most lenders want
them to, with a W-2' (quoting Interview with Stephanie Smith, Nat'l Manager of Cmty. Lending,
Bank of Am., in S.F., Cal. (Jul. 9, 2008), cited by David Listokin & Elvin K. Wyly, Making New
Mortgage Markets: Case Studies of Institutions, Home Buyers, and Communities, 11 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE 575, 604, 606, 625 (2000))).
10. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5-6, 210 (2000).
11. See Gorton, supra note 4, at 6-7 (citing Interview with Stephanie Smith, Nat'l Manager
of Cmty. Lending, Bank of Am., in S.F., Cal. (Jul. 9, 2008), cited by David Listokin & Elvin K.
Wyly, Making New Mortgage Markets: Case Studies of Institutions, Home Buyers, and
Communities, II HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 575, 604, 606, 625 (2000)) (explaining that
"undocumented income" was one reason why banks began extending subprime mortgages).
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to refinance to a lower rate mortgage before the ARM rate increase kicked in. 12
When the borrower had little de facto income, refinancing would be a
significant means by which these mortgages would be paid. When home
prices stopped apreciating, these borrowers could not refinance; in many cases,
they defaulted. Nor was the "originate-to-distribute" model of mortgage
lending, and its (allegedly) resulting moral hazard, the central problem causing
the crisis, as some have alleged. 5 This model is critical to ensuring lending
liquidity.' 6 Investors and credit insurers taking the ultimate risk on securities
backed by the mortgages should have more carefully assessed, and in the (near,
at least) future assuredly will carefully assess, their risk.
The financial crisis resulted from a cascade of failures, initially triggered by
the historically unanticipated depth of the fall in housing prices.' 7 In one sense,
the precipitous drop in home prices was unexpected. Like Monty Python's
skit, "NOBODY expects the Spanish Inquisition."' 9 In another sense, though,
the fall arguably should have been anticipated based on the liquidity glut20 and
artificially low interest rates, driving up housing prices artificially. Because of
the fall in housing prices, low income borrowers who could not refinance
12. See id. at 12-13.
13. See id. at 51.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 68 (stating that the originate-to-distribute model is the "dominant explanation"
for the financial panic). Under the originate-to-distribute model, mortgage lenders sell off loans as
they are made. See, e.g., Richard J. Rosen, The Role ofSecuriti ation in Mortgage Lending, CHI.
FED LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.) Nov. 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflnovember2007_244.pdf (explaining that unlike
lending practices common several decades ago, mortgages today are most often sold to third
parties shortly after being written).
16. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, THE JOINT FORUM ON CREDIT RISK
TRANSFER: DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2005 TO 2007, at 7 (2008), available at
http://fsforum.org/publications/r_0804c.pdf ("[Securities firms and banks] can profit from
originating, structuring and underwriting [credit risk transfer] in a wider range of asset classes.
They can earn fees while not having to hold the associated credit risk or fund positions over an
extended time period.").
17. See Gorton, supra note 4, at 49-50.
18. Cf id. at 50 n.57 ("The United States has not experienced [a] large, nationwide decline
in house prices since the Great Depression ofthe 1930s.").
19. Monty Python's Flying Circus: The Spanish Inquisition (BBC One television broadcast
Sept. 22, 1970) (transcript available at http://people.csail.mit.edu/paulfitz/spanish/script.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2009)).
20. See, e.g., Steven Pearlstein, Did You Hear the One About the Trade Deficit?, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 2006, at DI ("[Economists'] warning is that [the trade deficit] is, to a large extent,
really a 'liquidity glut' caused by central banks, primarily those of China and Japan."). There
appear to have been various causes contributing to this glut, including the U.S. Federal Reserve
providing inexpensive lending to banks to deter the financial impact of the dot-corn bust and
foreign sovereign wealth funds pouring cheap money into U.S. capital markets.
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through home appreciation were more likely to default. 21 Even borrowers who
could afford paying their mortgages were more tempted to walk away as
mortgage loans exceeded home values. These defaults in turn caused substantial
amounts of low investment-grade mortgage-backed securities to default and
AAA-rated securities to be downgraded. The defaults were especially large for
ABS CDO securities-a class of securities backed indirectly by subprime23
mortgages and other assets _because of the leveraged sensitivity of these
• 24
securities to underlying mortgage defaults.
That, in turn, spooked investors who believed that AAA meant ironclad
safety and that investment grade meant relative freedom from default. Investors
started losing confidence in ratings and avoiding debt securities. Fewer
investors meant that the price of debt securities started falling. Falling prices
meant that firms using debt securities as collateral had to mark them to market
and put up cash-requiring the sale of more securities-which caused market
prices to plummet further downward in a death spiral. 25 The high leverage of
many firms appears to have made this death spiral worse.26 Encouraged by the
earlier liquidity glut, many firms had borrowed excessively because the cost of
funds was so cheap.
The refusal of the government to save Lehman Brothers in mid-September
2008, and its resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Debt markets became
so spooked that even the commercial paper market virtually shut down. And the
market prices of mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the
21. Gorton, supra note 4, at 51.
22. See, e.g., MONETARY & CAPITAL MKTS. DEPT., INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL
SOUNDNESS 55 (2008) [hereinafter GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT], available at
http://www.imforg/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf ("In... 2007, the three main credit
rating agencies were forced to make precipitous downgrades on a large number of structured
finance products backed by U.S. subprime mortgages .... The downgraded securities included
some rated AAA, which is the safest rating possible."). For a discussion of rating agencies and
their ratings, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7-8.
23. For an explanation and comparison of the different types of mortgage-backed securities,
including CDO and ABS CDO securities, see Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note
1, at 376-79.
24. See id. at 376, 378-79.
25. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note , at 396-97.
26. Id. (citing Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov, Dynamic Leverage: A Contingent
Claims Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Fall 2004, at 25,
28.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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intrinsic value of the mortgage assets underlying those securities.28 These events
epitomize systemic risk, in which,
(i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of
markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases
in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price
volatility.
29
This collapse in market prices meant that banks and other financial
institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down the
securities' value. That caused these institutions to appear more financially risky,
in turn triggering concern over counterparty risk; afraid these institutions might
default on their contractual obligations, many parties stopped dealing with
them. 30 There was, in other words, an information failure caused by lack of
transparency as to counterparty financial condition.
31
In early October, the federal government stepped in to the rescue with the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), popularly known as
the Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP. 32 But the Federal Reserve
spearheaded the federal government's actions until September 2008 and focused
almost exclusively on protecting banks and other financial institutions against
collapse.33 This narrow focus reflected the Fed's historical and legal mission
memorialized in its organizing laws-which enables it, in "unusual and exigent
circumstances," to act as a lender of last resort to banks and other financial
28. See, e.g., GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 22 (discussing how
investors' unwillingness to invest in mortgage-backed securities "drove market valuations down to
levels below theoretical assumptions").
29. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 204.
30. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-
schwarcz/markets-systemic-risk-a b 92198.html (discussing how investors began to avoid
financial institutions such as Bear Stearns once these financial institutions had to write down the
value oftheir mortgage-backed securities).
31. This can be thought of as a form of adverse selection-an inability to distinguish good
market participants from bad market participants, motivating lenders to avoid extending credit to
any market participants.
32. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Star. 3765
(to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 note).
33. See Press Release, Neel Kashkari, Interim Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
Interim Assistant Secretary Neel Kashkari Remarks on Implementation of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/
hp] 281 .htm (outlining the actions by the Department ofthe Treasury and the Federal Reserve).
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institutions. 34 Such a narrow focus worked well when banks and institutions
were the primary source of corporate financing. But as the current financial
crisis reveals, this focus is insufficient now that companies engage in
disintermediation-obtaining much of their financing directly through capital
markets. 35 Although there is currently great attention paid to the need for the
government to bail out banks and other financial institutions, these institutions
would not have needed to be bailed out if their investment securities had
maintained market value reasonably corresponding to their intrinsic value.
36
In this context, I believe that some commentators and media have created
semantic confusion: claiming that the fundamental problem is one of
institutional solvency, not liquidity. 37 That claim conflates two different
meanings of solvency. The fundamental problem is the loss in market value of
investment securities held by banks and other financial institutions.38 This loss
in value represents a liquidity problem, in that the financial markets have few
buyers for these securities.39 Because the intrinsic value of these securities is
much greater than their market value, 40 these institutions are not necessarily
insolvent in the traditional sense of a fair valuation of their assets being less
than their liabilities. Some institutions may well be insolvent, though, in the
term's other (and less used) sense of being illiquid-being unable to meet their
liabilities as they come due. This would occur where institutions need to sell
investment securities to meet those liabilities, and the market price that would
be received in the sale would be insufficient.
4 1
34. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
35. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 200 (explaining that disintermediation is the
rising trend of companies gaining "access [to] the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets,
without going through banks or other financial intermediaries" (citing Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron
and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structure, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
1309, 1315 (2002))).
36. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz et al., Op-Ed., How Three Economists View a Financial
Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2008, at C4 (arguing that the underlying disease was financial
market failure and that the failure of banks and other financial institutions was merely a symptom
ofthe disease). Some believe, however, that the banking system is "fundamentally unsound." See,
e.g., Cowen, supra note 2 ("Many countries-not just the United States-came to have
fundamentally unsound banking systems."). To the extent the banking system is unsound, I believe
it is because ofthe loss in value of investment securities held by banks, as described above.
37. See, e.g., Cowen, supra note 2 (claiming that the banking system is "fundamentally
unsound").
38. See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 22; Schwarcz, supra note 30.
39. See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 22; Schwarcz, supra note 30.
40. See supra text accompanying note 28; infra text accompanying note 153.
41. Cf Steven L. Schwarcz, Op-Ed., Beyond the Bailout, FORBES.COM, Oct. 8, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/08/bailout-securities-regulation-oped-cx sls 1008schwarcz.html
(explaining that in times of financial crises, "Investors lose confidence by requiring companies to
sell assets to meet margin calls, which can artificially depress asset prices and cause a downward
spiral.").
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EESA may be needed to defuse the ongoing financial crisis, but at an
unfortunate cost to taxpayers. 42 If, for example, the government had
strategically purchased mortgage-backed and similar securities at the outset of
the crisis to stabilize markets, the credit collapse might have been avoided or
• • 43
lessened in impact, and we would not now be needing $700 billion, or more,
of taxpayer dollars.44 At that time, however, there may not have been the
political will to use taxpayer money in this innovative way.
II. How REALISTIC IS EESA?
As mentioned, I believe a bailout was needed. I am not a macroeconomist
and do not want to make predictions on how seriously the real economy would
have been impacted absent EESA. I do think that, potentially, it could have been
very badly impacted, possibly even leading to an economic depression. 45 As I
42. For further discussion on this issue, see Schwarcz, supra note 36 (explaining how the
cost to taxpayers would have been reduced if the Treasury had acted at the outset of the financial
panic).
43. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 151-72 (providing an example of how
strategically purchasing securities could stabilize market prices).
44. 1 urged Congress, in October 2007, to consider a process for making these types of
strategic purchases. See Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators' Ability to Respond to Threats to the
Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., I I0th Cong. 21 (2008)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Steven L. Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law and
Business, Duke University School of Law), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname-I 10 house hearings&docid-f:39903.pdf; see also Steven L. Schwarcz,
Editorial, Fed Must Also Guard Financial Markets, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 17, 2007,
at 15 (arguing that a lender of last resort could stabilize a failing financial system by buying
troubled securities); Schwarcz, supra note 30 (explaining how a "liquidity provider of last resort"
could restore confidence in a troubled market by establishing a floor for plummeting prices);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Editorial, Protecting Against Economic Shocks, BALT. SUN, Sept. 17, 2007, at
13A ("The [Federal Reserve] should... take reasonable precautions against economic shocks that
can seriously damage the economy."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Op-Ed., Systemic Risk Meets Subprime
Mortgages, FORBES.COM, May 1, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/01/subprime-fed-system-
oped-cx sls 0501subprime.html (analyzing the factors that lead to market failure which triggered
the subprime mortgage crisis and offering solutions for reforming market regulation).
45. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 5, at 79 (arguing that not passing bailout legislation
would "threaten[] the continuation ofthe economic life we know and [create] the specter of a crisis
even greater than the 1930s"). I am not quite certain why legislators proposed the bailout in such
urgency, though. Certainly the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the bailout of American
International Group (AIG), and the flight of capital from traditionally safe money market funds to
U.S. Treasury bills were wake-up calls to action. See, e.g., Turmoil in US Credit Markets: Recent
Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial
Institutions: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, I 10th Cong. 3
(2008) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.),
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ files/BERNANKEStatement092308_SenateBanking
Committee.pdf (discussing the collapse of Lehman Brothers and AIG and how an increase demand
for Treasury bills sent yields down to "a few hundredths of a percent"). The urgency may also have
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have said before: "With luck, the $700 billion authorized will, like a hospital
emergency room helping a patient, begin to stabilize credit markets and
financial institutions." But it is only a first step. To regain financial health, we
need to take additional steps, both in the short term and the long term. I will
discuss what additional steps may be needed after commenting briefly on
EESA's terms.
The major thrust of the bailout plan is for the government to minimize the
appearance, if not the actuality, of counterparty risk. Under the original plan,
counterparty risk would be minimized primarily by the government purchasing
mortgage-backed securities from banks and other financial institutions at a price
above the collapsed "market" price but, hopefully, at a deep discount from what
the securities are intrinsically worth.47 This would effectively recapitalize these
institutions with more transparently valuable assets-cash. However, this
approach ran into immediate political hurdles based on misunderstanding the
distinction between market price and intrinsic value. 48 Because the purchase
price paid by the government would have to be above "market" to avoid even
further counterparty write-offs, there was a populist perception that the
government would be unjustifiably bailing out Wall Street.49 In response, the
government now plans to recapitalize banks and other financial institutions
primarily by purchasing preferred, non-voting stock. 50 This approach is
consistent with the approach taken by the United Kingdom and the European
reflected inside knowledge that other financial institutions beyond AIG and Lehman Brothers, like
Wachovia, were in imminent danger of collapsing. Some urgency might also have reflected
concern about a chain of defaults in credit default swap obligations. See infra note 136 and
accompanying text (defining a credit default swap). More cynically, some of the urgency might
even have reflected the Bush Administration's use of fear to push through a rescue plan, thereby
appearing to begin solving the economic problem while in office and minimizing criticism.
Whatever the reason, the urgency in which legislators proposed the bailout itself created market
panic-by announcing the urgent timing, the government created a scenario in which the markets
would lose even more confidence ifthe Treasury's plan was not promptly enacted.
46. Schwarcz, supra note 41.
47. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(a)(1), 122
Star. 3765, 3767 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5211) (authorizing the Secretary ofthe Treasury to
purchase troubled assets).
48. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 5 (arguing that buying the mortgage-backed securities
at above market prices "provides[s] a huge, unjustified bailout for Wall Street" by "rescu[ing] the
financial industry from the consequences of its own misjudgments, profligacy, and greed").
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See, e.g., Joshua Brockman, Is the U.S. 'Nationaliing' Banks?, NPR, Oct. 14, 2008,
http://npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId-95700786 ("in a bid to restore confidence in the
financial markets and jump-start lending activity, the Treasury said it would buy up to $250 billion
of preferred shares of stocks in U.S. banks and savings and loans.").
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Union and thus establishes a united front globally.5 ' It also is more consistent
with what a majority of economists appear to be calling for.52
I would prefer that the government purchases assets rather than stock, since
the former does not get the government involved with ownership of private
institutions. But both approaches can work. Consider purchasing assets-in this
case, mortgage-backed securities. If the purchase price of the mortgage-backed
securities is, as believed, much lower than the intrinsic value of the securities, 53
the government, and therefore taxpayers, would profit. However, buying
mortgage-backed securities has its own issues, of course. Mortgage-backed
securities are hard to price absent transparency of the condition of the
underlying assets-such as mortgage loans-and their obligors.54 Part of the
very reason that the market has failed is that disclosure of some of the
mortgage-backed securities has "become so complex that investors are simply
uncertain about how much the securities are worth. 55 In that case, however, the
same flexible pricing approach that is used in structured financing transactions
to buy financial assets of uncertain value should work in this context,56
including the accounting considerations. 57 Mortgage-backed securities
purchases also could be coupled with taking equity or contingent equity, such as
warrants .5
51. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation's Largest Banks, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008, at Al ("[T]he U.K., Germany, France, Spain and Italy provided further
details of measures to buy stakes in struggling banks and offer lending guarantees that they
launched ..... ").
52. See, e.g., id. (quoting Jared Bernstein of the liberal Economic Policy Institute) ("'The
consensus was so strong towards direct equity injections that there was literally no dissension on
the point .... The only head-scratching is why did it take us so long to get here'?').
53. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
54. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure, supra note 1, at 9 ("[T]he very complexity of
securities backed by subprime mortgages makes it difficult to assess their suitability for
investment, potentially seducing individuals into seeing what they are already inclined to believe-
that these securities are creditworthy.").
55. Schwarcz, supra note 41; see also Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure, supra note 1, at 9
(noting that the complexity of securities backed by subprime mortgages makes it difficult to assess
their value).
56. See STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 4:10, at 4-29 (3d ed. supplemented through Nov. 2008) (explaining that
if a buyer and seller are unsure of asset value in a structured financing transaction the seller may
sell the buyer the right to collect a portion of the asset value upon resell but retain the right to
collect the rest).
57. See id. at § 7:3, at 7-4 to 7-6 (explaining these accounting considerations) (discussing
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF
LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2000), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas 140.pdf).
58. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure, supra note 1, at 9 ("[T]he very complexity of
securities backed by subprime mortgages makes it difficult to assess their suitability for
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The government must also consider other issues that it will face in
determining the value of these mortgage-backed securities. For example,
[L]n establishing prices at which it will purchase the "troubled"
mortgage-backed securities held by banks and other financial
institutions, the government must insulate the price-setting process
from inevitable lobbying pressure to pay more than the securities are
worth. This is important not only to ensure fairness and to give
taxpayers a chance to profit, but also to instill the credit markets with
confidence in valuing these types of securities.59
Buying stock avoids any accounting and potential asset write-off issues, but it
raises other issues such as pricing the stock itself. Buying stock also puts the
government in the undesirable position of owning equity interests in private
financial institutions. Nonetheless, it is critically important that the government
is acting decisively. Although any bailout plan creates moral hazard,6 1 that is a
much lower risk now than an economic depression. 62 To date, the approach of
buying stock has not been entirely successful. Among other problems,
recapitalized banks have been highly reticent to make new loans.
6 3
EESA includes other provisions. For example, it permits the Secretary of
the Treasury to, "[u]pon request of a financial institution.., guarantee the
timely payment of principal of, and interest on, troubled assets." 64 It also
mandates a much needed study of mark-to-market, or "fair value," accounting.
65
The use of mark-to-market accounting "generally stabilizes financial markets by
creating trust that assets are fairly valued."6 6 However, as in the subprime crisis,
investment, potentially seducing individuals into seeing what they are already inclined to believe-
that these securities are creditworthy.").
59. Schwarcz, supra note 41.
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61. Cf Hearing, supra note 44, at 13 (explaining how a liquidity provider of last resort
could create moral hazard and proposing methods to control such moral hazard).
62. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 5, at 79 (arguing that not doing a bailout would
"threaten[] the continuation ofthe economic life we know and [create] the specter of a crises even
greater than the 1930s").
63. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, Costs and Tighter Rules Thwart Refinancings, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at BI (explaining that the Federal Reverse's plan to buy up mortgage-backed
securities appears to be failing as borrowers continue to face major stumbling blocks to getting
loans and lenders are being more cautious in making loans).
64. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 102(a)(3), 122
Star. 3765, 3769 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5212).
65. Id. § 133(a), 122 Star. at 3798 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5238).
66. See Schwarcz, supra note 41; see also Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra
note 1, at 396 ("Requiring investors to mark prices to market value in this fashion is generally
believed to reduce risk.").
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it can destabilize markets when investors lose confidence during times of
market turbulence "by requiring firms to sell assets to meet margin calls, which
can artificially depress asset prices and cause a downward spiral."6 7 Firms then
"should be allowed to substitute other measures of investor comfort" for mark-
to-market, "such as allowing a [firm] otherwise required to mark-to-market to
have the oltion, instead, to disseminate full disclosure of its underlying asset
portfolio." For example, a firm that owns CDO securities should be able to
choose to disclose details about the mortgage loans and other financial assets
underlying those securities in lieu of marking the securities to market, thereby
enabling investors and other market participants to make more transparent
valuations.
6 9
EESA also enables the government to purchase securities to kick-start
markets,7 ° as it is now doing in the commercial paper market and is about to do
with money market funds. Significantly for homeowners, another provision that
may not have been fully appreciated when enacted, EESA also "gives theS ,,71
government power to stall foreclosure on mortgage loans that it purchases.
This may turn out to be a close "practical equivalent of amending the
bankruptcy law for those homeowners; absent foreclosure, lenders and servicers1 ,,72 T
will be forced to work out alternate repayment terms with the homeowners. it
is unclear, however, how this will work if neither mortgage-backed securities
67. Schwarcz, supra note 41; see also supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
68. Schwarcz, supra note 41; see also Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note
1, at 399 (explaining how market participants lost confidence in mortgage-backed securities
because they did not have enough information to accurately assess the securities' value).
69. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 398 ("The indirect holding
system for securities also made it very difficult to ascertain whether CDO and ABS CDO securities
were held by securitization counterparties, and as long as that system continues to dominate
securities holdings, this difficulty will remain."). This approach also would help reduce the
anomaly, seen during the subprime crisis, of securities bearing market values significantly lower
than the present value, if known, oftheir reasonably expected cash flows. See id. at 396.
70. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(1), 122
Star. 3765, 3766 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201) ("The purposes of this Act are... to
immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore
liquidity and stability to the financial system ofthe United States ....").
71. Schwarcz, supra note 41; see also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §§ 109-10 (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5219, 5220) (directing the Secretary of the Treasury to encourage
mortgage servicers to work to minimize foreclosures and directing the Secretary to assist with loan
renegotiations to avoid foreclosures).
72. Schwarcz, supra note 41; see also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 109(c) (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5219) (requiring consent to reasonable loan modification requests).
Working out the loan, rather than foreclosing, can actually increase the value of recovery to the
mortgagee while allowing the homeowner to stay in his home. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial
Markets, supra note 1, at 391-93. In this context, also consider how, if at all, the upcoming ARM
resets should be treated and the impact of not treating them.
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nor mortgage loans are purchased. To the extent it does not work, the
government must focus on other approaches to increase homeowner
affordability. 74 Otherwise, continuing foreclosure will result in greater home
value depreciation, further pulling down the real economy. 5 The plan also
limits executive compensation for the top five executives of firms in which the
government takes a stake, limits "golden parachutes," and requires these firms• • 76
to take a more long-term view to executive compensation . Finally, if there are
losses five years into the plan's program, EESA contemplates the possibility of
recouping such losses from the financial industry.77
111. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO AVOID FUTURE FINANCIAL CRISES?
It is impossible to know how future financial crises will arise. Ultimately,
the key to protecting against future crises is to remain open, flexible, and aware
of changing circumstances. To this end, the government should take a broad and
flexible approach. I have mentioned how the Federal Reserve, initially tasked to
address the building financial crisis, focused almost entirely on its narrow legal
'78mandate. It may well be helpful to have a central governmental agency with a
mandate to protect against financial crises of any type, including financial
instability. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) is the single organization responsible for almost all financial
institutions and markets; 79 several other countries have their own governmental
73. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act §§ 109-10 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
5219, 5220) (demonstrating that for the Federal government to have real power, beyond merely
encouraging private servicers to alter loans and avoid foreclosures, the government must hold or
control an interest in the mortgages).
74. Schwarcz, supra note 41. These ways might include, for example, amending bankruptcy
law to allow judges to modify the terms of home mortgage loans.
75. See, e.g., Amilda Dymi, Outlook: Home Value Depreciation Will Continue This Year,
NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/premium/
archive/?id-162360 (reporting that some of the largest home value depreciations are occurring in
areas with the highest foreclosure rates).
76. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 11 (b)(2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5221) (giving standards for executive compensation and corporate governance of firms that sell
troubled assets to the government under this Act).
77. See id. § 134 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5238) (explaining that five years after the
enactment of the Act, the President must submit a legislative proposal for recouping any losses
from the financial industry so as not to add to the deficit or national debt).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
79. See Financial Services Authority, Who We Regulate, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/
About/What/Who/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) ("The FSA regulates most financial
services markets, exchanges and firms.").
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equivalents of the FSA. 80 However, fully centralizing government responsibility
in a single agency might itself create an unintended degree of tunnel vision. It
also would reduce competition among agencies, which might lower the quality
of regulation.8' Query whether it is better to have separate agencies with merely
something like a centralized coordinating committee.
To protect against future crises, we also should try to learn from the nature
of the fundamental failures causing the subprime crisis. In my article,
Protecting Financial Markets. Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown,82 1 argued that most of the causes of the subprime financial crisis can
be divided conceptually into three categories: conflicts, complacency, and
complexity. These categories are broad, but they do not capture everything.
For instance, a fourth possible category of causes is cupidity. However,
greed "is so ingrained in human nature and so intertwined with the other
categories that it adds little insight to view it as a separate category." 83
Government cannot meaningfully legislate against greed. Moreover, as Gordon
Gekko famously said in the movie Wall Street, greed is-at least in
moderation-good.84 Jewish law recognizes, for example, that the yetzer hara,
or evil impulse, is only problematic when yielded to in excess; in moderation, it
is necessary to foster reproduction of the species and, in the commercial sector,
to stimulate trade and commerce through the profit motive.
85
80. See, e.g., BaFin, Functions, http://www.bafin.de/cln-l16/nn_720494/EN/BaFin/
Functions/functions.html? nnn-true (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (explaining that Bundesanstalt
for Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) is the German organization charged with overseeing
Germany's financial market system).
81. See Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum Out of Many, One: Why the United States
Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 100-01 (2005) ("[T]he
optimal number of financial regulators in the United States is one. A single, federal financial
regulator would be able to anticipate and plan for future financial crises, more carefully monitor
and regulate financial conglomerates, provide better protection for consumers, operate more
effectively in international negotiations, quickly adapt to market innovations and developments, be
accountable for market failures, eliminate the duplicative regulations and regulatory gaps,
harmonize regulations for financial products and firms competing in the market, and avoid being
captured by narrow segments within the financial services industry.").
82. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1.
83. Id. at 405-06.
84. WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987) (partial transcript available at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechwallstreet.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2009)) ("The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed-for lack of a better word-is good.").
85. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Jews, Christians, Lawyers, and Money, 25 VT. L. REV.
451, 468 (2001) (citing MEIR TAMARI, THE CHALLENGE OF WEALTH: A JEWISH PERSPECTIVE ON
EARNING AND SPENDING MONEY 158, 162-63 (1995)) (explaining that Judaism recognizes that
the yet er hara, the spirit of greed and lust, is needed but must be proscribed by imposing limits,
such as those against hoarding or corruption).
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These categories also fail to embrace the full scope of systemic risk,
"whose uniqueness arises from a type of tragedy of the commons. ' ' 6 Being that
"the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market
participants whereas the costs of exploitation," which affect the real economy,
"are distributed among an even wider class of persons, market participants have
insufficient incentive to internalize their externalities."87 Therefore, even in a
simple financial system with no conflicts and hyper-diligent market participants,
systemic risk is theoretically possible. I am not claiming that lack of incentive to
take care necessarily creates systemic problems, but merely that lacking that
incentive means the system is not necessarily protected and thus is more
exposed to problems that undermine it. I will address this more theoretical
nature of the problem of systemic risk after addressing the fundamental
categories of conflicts, complacency, and complexity-which themselves can
lead, as in the current financial crisis, to systemic collapse. These categories
embody market failures that firms should have protected against in their own
self-interest. The interesting question is why firms failed to do so.
The first category, conflicts, is the most tractable because, once identified,
conflicts can often be managed.88 For example, concerns about moral hazard
resulting from the "originate-[to]-distribute model can be managed by [better]
aligning the interests of mortgage lenders and investors [such as] by requiring
the former to retain a risk of loss." 9 Also, firms can manage conflicts-such as
high compensation and bonuses for arranging deals or investments that later
fail-in the way they pay managers by taking a more long-term view to
compensation, which EESA now requires in a limited context.90 This should be
done not only for top managers but also for secondary managers, who make
many important decisions regarding investments. 91 Consider, however, the
extent to which super-large compensation, even if a portion can be clawed back
(i.e., retroactively recovered) or contingently paid over time, creates inherent
conflicts. For example, if an individual's compensation, even if it were to be
fully adjusted downward, still enables that individual to be financially
86. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 406.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 404.
89. Id.
90. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111, 122
Star. 3765, 3776 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5221) (listing standards governing salaries for
executives at "[a]ny financial institution that sells troubled assets to the Secretary"). However,
some conflicts "may be harder to manage in practice, such as conflicts in how rating agencies are
paid." Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 404.
91. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Conflicts, supra note 1, at 12 ("Because compensation is at the root
of the conflict between firms and their secondary manager, the most effective way to align
incentives is to tie secondary-manager compensation to long-term interests ofthe firm.").
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independent of the firm, then that individual's incentives will not necessarily be
aligned with the firm's incentives.
Complacency is a more difficult category because the government cannot
change human nature-although it can try to affect behavior. 92 During a
financial crisis, everyone becomes focused on the problems at hand and on how
to avoid them in the future. 93 But once the crisis recedes from memory and
investors are again making money, the experience is that investors will always
"go for the gold."94 Professor Cowen makes essentially this same point about
the subprime crisis: "The real problem is ... that we cannot help but put the
evaluation of risk into all-too-human hands." 95 Furthermore, some forms of
complacency are at least partly rational. For example, some investors may
realize that market prices are artificially inflated, yet they continue to buy in
with the hopes of selling just before the bubble bursts-while prices are at their
zenith. 97 Also, "investors will almost certainly continue to overrely on rating-
agency ratings, so long as the cost of making independent credit investigations
remains high."
98
Complexity is the most difficult category. It is "increasingly a metaphor for
the modern financial system and its potential for failure." 99 In another paper, I
observed that "[s]olving problems of financial complexity may well be the
ultimate twenty-first century market goal."' 00 Complexity comes in at least two
forms. First, there is "cognizant complexity"-things are just too complex to
understand. 10 1 This manifests itself, for example, in the difficulty of achieving
transparent disclosure for complicated securities and also in the difficulty of
market participants to learn the financial condition of their counterparties (due,
for example, to their entering into credit-default swaps). 102 Second, there is
92. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 404
("[C]omplacency, is less tractable because solutions to complacent behavior can require changing
human nature, an obviously impossible task.").
93. Id.
94. Cf Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, BUS.
WK., Mar. 29, 1993, at 34 (discussing that within years after the RJR Nabisco, Inc. takeover,
investors favored higher interest rates over "event risk" covenants because the examples of events
justifying the covenants had receded in memory). As Light noted: "Bondholders can-and will-
fuss all they like. But the reality is, their options are limited: Higher returns or better protection.
Most investors will continue to go for the gold." Id.
95. Cowen, supra note 2.
96. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 382 (explaining why
investors who recognize a market bubble as irrational may rationally decide to buy in).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 405.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 4.
102. Id.
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"temporal" complexity-in a complex system, signals are sometimes
inadvertently transmitted too quickly to control. 103 This manifests itself, for
example, in the "tight coupling" 04 that causes markets to move rapidly into a
crisis mode. 
05
Consider first how to address cognizant complexity, initially addressing the
failure of disclosure and then addressing the difficulty of market participants to
learn the financial condition of their counterparties. For the failure of disclosure,
investors can partly address this failure by demanding more and better
disclosure, including disclosure of contingent liabilities. 106 Next, regarding the
difficulty of market participants to learn the financial condition of their
counterparties, there are at least two reasons for this difficulty. One reason is
that it can be difficult to value a counterparty's assets. 10 7 In the subprime crisis,
this was illustrated by the difficulty in valuing the mortgage-backed securities
owned by counterparties. 08 I have, at least in part, already discussed this
difficulty. 0 9 The other reason for this difficulty is that a counterparty may have
taken on undisclosed contingent liabilities. 110 In the subprime financial crisis,
103. Id. at5.
104. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 395 (citing RICHARD M.
BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF
FINANCIAL INNOVATION 144 (2007)) (adopting this term introduced by Rick Bookstaber, who
originally borrowed the term from engineering nomenclature).
105. The effects of these types of complexities can combine-the cognizant complexity
caused by the unexpected consequences of marking-to-market which, like a complex engineering
system subject to nonlinear feedback effects, resulted in a downward death spiral of prices when
marking-to-market occurred in unstable markets. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets,
supra note 1, at 396.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69. But cf Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure,
supra note 1, at 16 (showing why solutions to this failure are all second best).
107. See Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 28-30 (discussing how counterparties are
interconnected and using Bear Stearns as an example to demonstrate the difficulty of valuing
counterparty assets).
108. Id. Related to this is the difficulty in knowing even the quantity and types of
investment securities held by a counterparty. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying note 28.
110. Under generally accepted accounting principles, a contingent liability only needs to be
shown on a company's balance sheet if the contingency is "probable." ACCOUNTING FOR
CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 5, 8-13, at 5-7 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1975), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas5.pdf. Contingent liabilities must be
disclosed in the footnotes to the balance sheet if the contingency is a "reasonable possibility." Id.
10 (allowing only remote risks to remain undisclosed). Moreover, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board requires guarantors at least to recognize on their balance sheets a liability for the
fair value of the guarantee obligation. GUARANTOR'S ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARANTEES, INCLUDING INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF INDEBTEDNESS OF
OTHERS, FASB Interpretation No. 45, 9, at 10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2002). Finally, as
authorized by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m(j) (Supp. 2008), the SEC has
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for example, one of the reasons market participants have had difficulty learning
the financial condition of their counterparties is that so many firms entered into
over-the-counter credit derivatives under which they bought or sold risk. III
Although a potential future solution to this problem is to centrally register
credit-derivative transactions, 112 1 am skeptical of the solution's efficacy
because, as I will discuss, the chameleon-like nature of derivatives makes it
difficult to determine what constitutes a credit derivative, and thus what should
be required to be registered. 113
Next, consider how to address temporal complexity, where signals are
inadvertently transmitted too quickly to control. To address temporal
complexity, we need to loosen the tight coupling that causes markets to move
rapidly into a crisis mode. I have argued that this can be done by a
governmental or other entity acting as the equivalent of a "market liquidity
provider of last resort" to help stabilize irrationally panicked markets by
purchasing securities. 114 This type of targeted market investment should
generate relatively minimal costs, and certainly lower costs than those of a
"lender of last resort" to financial institutions-the Federal Reserve's traditional
role. 115
When a lender of last resort provides a lifeline to financial institutions, it
"fosters moral hazard by potentially encouraging these institutions-especially
those that believe they are 'too big to fail'-to be fiscally reckless .... [1]oans
made to these institutions will not be repaid if the institutions eventually fail."
116
A market liquidity provider, in contrast, "especially if it acts at the outset of a
market panic," 117 may invest profitably "in securities at a deep discount from
the market price and still provide a 'floor' to how low the market will drop."
118
promulgated 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(4)(i)(C) (2008), which requires disclosure of contingent
liabilities that are "reasonably likely to become material."
111. See infra text accompanying notes 135-55.
112. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Op-Ed., Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2008, at WK12 ("Congress could require that dealers in over-the-counter credit-default
swaps publicly report both their trades and the value of those trades.").
113. See infra text accompanying notes 138-55.
114. Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 43. Markets normally can fluctuate widely. I
am contemplating action only when, in an irrationally panicked market, the market price of
securities is falling substantially below their intrinsic value, see id. at 44, the latter determined, in
the case of asset-backed securities for example, by present valuing an estimate of the expected
value of cash flows from obligors. See Simon Gervais & Steven L. Schwarcz, Valuation of Risky
Cash Flows (working paper on file with author); infra note 156 and accompanying text.
115. See Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 47; supra text accompanying note 34.
116. See Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 48-49.
117. Id. at 49 (emphasis added). The mechanics of timing purchases will be critical. The
market liquidity should be careful not to act, however, when price fluctuations are normal. See
supra note 114 and accompanying text.
118. Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 49.
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Buying at a deep discount will mitigate moral hazard and also make it likely
that the market liquidity provider will be repaid. 119 Such a market liquidity
provider is needed because, in a panicked market, private investors may not act
rationally. 120 Furthermore, private institutional investors usually want to buy
and sell securities-not wait for them to mature. An investor who knows that
the market price of securities has fallen below its intrinsic value may not want
to risk having to wait until maturity of the securities to profit, especially if the
market value of the securities is still falling.121 A governmental market liquidity
provider, however, should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary. 122
Next consider the more theoretical nature of the problem of systemic risk.
Recall that "[b]ecause the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue
to individual market participants whereas the costs of exploitation are
distributed among an even wider class of persons, market participants have
insufficient incentive to internalize their externalities." 2 3 These are externalities
that firms, out of self-interest, should not necessarily protect against. Therefore,
even if market participants fully understand that incurring certain risks may
contribute to systemic risk, they will not be motivated, absent regulation, to
internalize those risks. 124 Conceptually, therefore, the solution to systemic riski.. 125
is to impose regulation that internalizes those externalities.
It is unclear, however, what regulation can do to require market participants
to internalize all of their externalities because of the myriad of ways in which
externalities can arise. 126 In the subprime crisis, for example, "imposing
'suitability' requirements on mortgage loans and otherwise restrictingS .. 127
'predatory' lending" may have helped to internalize externalities. However,
these restrictions almost certainly will not address the next crisis. 128 Similarly,
making mortgage lending safer, such as imposing the equivalent of margin
regulations (i.e., minimum collateral coverage) on mortgage loans-a
119. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 229.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 96-113.
121. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 396.
122. See id. at 406 (concluding that private investors have little incentive to invest in
troubled securities and that a liquidity provider is therefore needed to "mitigate market
instability"); Schwarcz, Systematic Risk, supra note 1, at 229 (explaining that a liquidity provider
is immune to the herd behavior that prevents private investors from investing in troubled assets).
123. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 406.
124. See, e.g., id. at 386 ("Investors are .. unlikely to care about disclosure to the extent it
pertains to systemic risk.").
125. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 206 ("Without regulation, the
externalities caused by systemic risk would not be prevented or internalized .... ).
126. Schwarcz, Markets, supra note 1, at 214 (quoting Eduardo Porter, Shanghai What-If"
How a Shock Can Become a Shock Wave, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, at WK3).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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regulatory approach imposed by the Federal Reserve under Regulations G,
129
U, T, and X 132 in response to the Great Depression 133 -would have
addressed the subprime crisis, but they would have had the unintended
consequence of making the cost of housing more expensive.
134
Another way that market participants may have created externalities in the
subprime crisis was by entering into over-the-counter credit derivatives,135 such
as credit default swaps under which credit risk is bought and sold. 136 These
swaps reduced transparency, thereby increasing the appearance, if not the
actuality, of counterparty risk by dispersing credit risk contractually without a
central place to ascertain how the risk was ultimately allocated. 137 The obvious
regulatory solution is to require that parties to these types of derivatives
transactions, or intermediaries for those parties, keep a registry of the
transactions from which market participants can ascertain risk allocation. 38 Any
such solution, however, would be imperfect. Derivatives are chameleon-like, in
that they easily can change form and appearance, and there are a myriad of
ways that risk can be transferred in transactions not regarded as derivatives,
such as a simple guarantee for payment of a fee. 13 9 Any regulation of credit
129. 12 C.F.R. § 207 (2008).
130. Id. § 220.
131. Id. §221.
132. Id. § 224.
133. In the Great Depression, collapsing stock prices caused margin loans to become
undercollateralized, which caused borrowers to default, which caused banks to default, which in
turn caused systemic chains ofbank failures.
134. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 390 ("Imposing a minimum
real-estate-value-to-loan overcollateralization on all mortgage loans secured by the real estate
financed would likewise protect against a repeat ofthe subprime mortgage problem. Unfortunately,
though, it would have a high price, potentially impeding and increasing the cost of home
ownership and imposing an administrative burden on lenders and government monitors.").
135. Over-the-counter simply means that market participants entered into these derivatives
contractually and not on an exchange.
136. In a credit default swap, one party (the credit seller) agrees, in exchange for the
payment to it of a fee by a second party (the credit buyer), to assume the credit risk of certain debt
obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 56, at § 10:1.1, at
10-5. If a "credit event" (for example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect of that obligor, the
credit seller will either (a) pay the credit buyer an amount calculated by reference to post default
value of the debt obligations or (b) buy the debt obligations (or other eligible debt obligations of
the obligor) for their full face value from the credit buyer. Id.
137. See Cox, supra note 112 ("There is no public disclosure nor any legal requirement for
these contracts to be reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other agency. So
government regulators have had no way to assess how much risk is in the system, whether credit-
default swaps have been accurately valued or honestly traded, and when people issuing and trading
them have taken on risk that threatens others.").
138. See supra text accompanying note 112.
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) (2006) (defining a "swap agreement"). Even a simple loan
agreement can be characterized as a credit derivative.
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derivatives therefore will have to grapple with the problem of defining what is
being regulated, with a narrow focus potentially omitting risk transfers that
should be covered and a broad focus potentially being overly restrictive by
including traditional commercial transactions. Regulation also should recognize
that risk transfer is not inherently bad. It can maximize efficiency if risk is
transferred to parties better able to bear the risk-a goal that unregulated
markets should achieve. 40  am nonetheless concerned whether, in the subprime
crisis, the degree of risk dispersion has created a type of collective-action
problem: the ultimate risk-bearing parties do not always have sufficient amounts
at risk regardin any given underlying credit risk to motivate them to engage in
due diligence.
Market participants also may have created externalities by incurring too
much debt because the liquidity glut that preceded the subprime crisis gave142
firms incentives to borrow at low cost. High leverage fosters systemic risk
and hence externalities-by making it more likely that a firm will fail, thereby
triggering failures of other highly-leveraged counterparty firms. 143 Regulating
leverage could create significant costs, however. To an extent, some leverage is
beneficial, "though there is no optimal across-the-board amount of leverage that
is right for every company."' 4 Therefore, "Regulation that attempts to track
optimal leverage thus would be nuanced and highly complex, as illustrated by
the complexity of the Basel II capital adequacy requirements." 45 The Basel II
capital adequacy requirements, "designed to reduce the leverage of banks,
mandate that banks hold minimum amounts of capital as a function of the
riskiness of their assets."' 146 However, it has been observed that "'the advanced
140. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 25 (1999), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf (finding that "private counterparty
discipline" should prevent parties from incurring excessive risk).
141. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 1, at 381 (arguing that investors
failed to exercise due diligence in assessing the value of complex asset-backed securities,
collateralized debt obligations, and ABS CDO securities because the costs outweighed the apparent
benefits for individual investors).
142. See supra text accompanying note 20.
143. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 224 (explaining that highly
leveraged institutions may be unable to pay their debts, which may in turn cause them to default
and fail).
144. Id.
145. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 224.
146. Id.; see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 2-5
(2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf Other than as discussed above, I am
specifically not engaging in the debates as to whether banks need enhanced capital and reserve
requirements and whether non-deposit taking financial institutions that perform financial
intermediary functions ("near banks") should be subjected to capital or reserve requirements.
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approaches of Basel 11 are "too complex" for anyone to understand, and the
mathematical formulas in various drafts of the framework can look like a
foreign language to some readers." ' 147 Furthermore, "[i]mposing unnunanced
[sic] limitations on leverage.., could impair a firm's ability to operate
efficiently and impede economic growth."14
8
Absent effective means to avoid systemic risk by requiring market
participants to internalize externalities, there still may be a pragmatic way to
mitigate the likelihood of systemic collapse. Systemic collapses result from a
chain of defaults; 149 if the chain can be broken, the defaults will not be
transmitted. A liquidity provider of last resort can break the chain of defaults.
The Federal Reserve traditionally has acted as such a liquidity provider to banks
and other financial institutions to break the chain of institutional defaults. 150 In
contrast, a market liluidity provider of last resort, much along the lines
previously discussed, can break the chain of financial market defaults by
stabilizing irrationally panicked markets. 152 Consider how such a market
liquidity provider of last resort could have helped to avoid the subprime
mortgage meltdown. Once the market liquidity provider recognized that panic
was causing the market prices of mortgage-backed securities to fall materially
below the level of their intrinsic value, the market liquidity provider could
have stepped in to purchase sufficient quantities of those securities to stabilize
the mortgage-backed securities markets. ' 5 4 Even though the stabilized price
147. Schwarcz, Systematic Risk, supra note 1, at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Susan Schmidt Bies, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Basel II
Developments in the United States, Remarks Before the Institute of International Bankers (Sept.
26, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050926/
default.htm).
148. Id. Of course, the trick "will be trying to find a simple way of determining the
appropriate maximum amount of leverage for different types of companies-in each case a
maximum that neither impairs the companies' ability to operate efficiently nor impedes economic
growth." Id. at 239.
149. Id. at 224.
150. See supra text accompanying note 34.
151. See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
152. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 225-30, 239-42; see also Schwarcz,
Complexity, supra note 1, at 43-44 (discussing using modularity to reduce danger from complex
systems) (citations omitted).
153. This became apparent to me at the beginning of July 2008, based on my work as an
expert witness in the London Chancery Court involving a failed structured investment vehicle. See
Bank of N.Y. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., [2008] EWHC 1584 (Ch.). Market observers presumably
would have noticed this even earlier.
154. See Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 225 (citing Michael D. Bordo et al., Real
Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some Lessonsfrom History 19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 5371, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5371.pdf
(explaining that panic, when lenders lack resources to extend loans, will usually not become
contagious when a lender of last resort provides adequate liquidity). Although I talk about
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would be deeply discounted from the intrinsic value of those securities, it still
would be much higher than prices in a collapsed market. 155
For example, if the intrinsic price-essentially the present value of the
• .156
expected value of the cash flows on the mortgage-backed securities -was,
say, eighty cents on the dollar, and the market price had fallen to, say, fifty
cents on the dollar, the market liquidity provider could purchase these securities
at seventy cents on the dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a
profit. 157
Failed governmental efforts to try to control their currency exchange
rates 158 might raise concerns about whether a market liquidity provider, even if
governmental, would have sufficient spending power to stabilize irrationally
panicked debt markets. Only Hong Kong was able to control its currency
exchange rate, and that was because its reserves, which implicitly included all
of China's reserves, were large enough to be credible. 159 There are important
distinctions, though, between controlling a currency exchange rate and
purchasing securities, the concept of a market liquidity provider is not necessarily tied to actual
purchases. There may well be alternative market liquidity approaches. My colleague Professor Bill
Brown and I are currently exploring the possibility of the market liquidity provider taking a more
targeted approach to stabilizing panicked markets by entering into derivative contracts to strip out
the elements that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging.
155. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 1, at 229 n.225. In the subprime mortgage
meltdown, at least a portion of the mortgage-backed securities markets, including those for ABS
CDO securities, were privately-placed debt markets. See, e.g., Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1,
at 10 (describing how special purpose vehicles derive payments on mortgage-backed securities
principally from the underlying loans). These thin markets might not react responsively to a market
liquidity provider's purchases. Nonetheless, there was a virtual market for ABS CDO securities,
created by the ABX.HE indices. This virtual market was sufficiently large that it should have
reacted responsively to purchases made by a market liquidity provider. The ABX.HE indices
simulate the risk and reward of trading in asset- and mortgage-backed securities. Id. A potential
investor, for example, can decide to invest in asset-backed securities represented by one of the
indices, without actually purchasing the underlying securities. The investor is thus not limited to
specific securities or to amounts of those securities that are actually physically available for
purchase. The ABX.HE indices also help to facilitate hedging. A lender, dealer, or hedge fund with
excessive asset-backed securities exposure, for example, not only can attempt to buy protection
from counterparties but now can also hedge its exposure through the indices.
156. This amount could be estimated, as was done in the London Chancery Court case in
which I served as an expert witness, by examining the mortgage loans underlying the securities and
ascertaining which were subprime, prime, and delinquent or in default. See Bank of N. Y, [2008]
EWHC at 1584; supra note 153.
157. The U.S. Treasury's Fall 2008 purchases of mortgage-backed securities issued by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac illustrated this potential, driving down thirty-year fixed mortgage
rates a full percentage point and creating a refinancing boom. Eric Dash & Vikas Bajaj, In 2009,
Economy Will Depend on Unlocking Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at B.
158. See, e.g., Bordo et al., supra note 154, at 23-26 (describing currency crises in various
countries and governmental efforts to handle those crises).
159. See id.
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stabilizing an irrationally panicked debt market. Controlling a currency
exchange rate depends on all of the macroeconomic factors to which the country
in question is subject, whereas stabilizing a panicked debt market depends
.• 160
mostly on factors specific to the debt securities in question. Also, the market
liquidity provider should consider acting only when a panicked debt market is
so irrational that the market value of its securities is significantly below their
intrinsic value.16 Therefore, the market liquidity provider should be able to
stem the information asymmetry leading to this valuation differential by
explaining the irrationality and, by buying at an above-market price, putting its
money where its mouth is. It effectively would be providing to investors in that
debt market the same type of real credibility and comfort that a country's large
• . 162
reserves provide to currency investors.
In the subprime crisis, however, by ignoring the collapse of the debt
markets for so long, we may have already gone beyond a tipping point in the
ability of market purchases alone to correct the problem and, therefore, must
also focus on resolving counterparty risk. This is because market prices have
collapsed so low that banks and other financial institutions-forced to write
down the value of their debt securities portfolios to market prices-appear
inadequately capitalized, creating the counterparty risk.163 That, in turn, has
virtually shut down the credit markets, and the diminished credit is harming the
real economy because firms need credit to operate and grow. Even worse, in a
feedback loop, the crashing real economy makes it more likely that obligors on
assets underlying the debt securities will default. This risk of default feeds back
into lower market prices, which in turn further reduces credit, and which in turn
further harms the real economy.164 Our job now is to regain confidence to
escape this feedback loop.
160. Cf supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing methods for determining the
intrinsic value oftroubled stock).
161. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
162. Any analogy of a market liquidity provider to the Bank of Japan's failed attempt to
support the Tokyo Stock Exchange's Nikkei index would also be inappropriate. The Nikkei is an
index of shares of 225 companies selected to be representative of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as a
whole, and thus the price ofthose shares turns on a multitude ofmacroeconomic factors, including
Japan's financial condition. See generally Michael S. Bennett & Michael J. Marin, The Casablanca
Paradigm: Regulatory Risk in the Asian Financial Derivatives Markets, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.,
Autumn 1999, at 1, 4 n. 19 (explaining how the Nikkei 225 operates).
163. See Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 36-38 (explaining that because generally
accepted accounting principles require disclosures of certain debts and contingent liabilities, one
must make judgment calls on how likely a contingency is to occur, which could result in over- or
under-pricing of counterparty risk).
164. See GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, supra note 22 (discussing the effect that
defaults on mortgage payments had on stock prices).
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Long term, to help address and solve capital-market problems, we need
fresh, unbiased ideas from an advisory group, or "brain trust" of scholars who
have been studying these markets, as well as from experts with real-life market
experience. Past knowledge is insufficient. For example, much of the present
market crisis is tied to increasing market complexity which causes (like a
complex engineering system subject to nonlinear feedback effects) unexpected
consequences from otherwise routine and desirable actions-such as the
downward death spiral of marking to market. 165 And the very nature of modern
financial markets, which causes events to move rapidly into crisis mode with
little time or opportunity to intervene, amplifies these unexpected166
consequences. Such a brain trust "could function, formally or otherwise, by
having access to government regulators at all levels and branches." 167 Members
of the group would "suggest ideas and critique proposed government
actions."
President Roosevelt took a similar approach in response to the Great
Depression. 169 One difference, though, is that because financial markets cross
national borders, any brain trust should include at least some foreign experts in
addition to Americans. 7 0 If the government attempts to solve financial crises
without this type of critical input, I fear that the solutions will continue to be
makeshift, illusory, and costly. At the end of the day, we should be careful not
to overregulate or micromanage markets, lest our markets lose their competitive
edge.
165. See Schwarcz, Complexity, supra note 1, at 63.
166. Id.
167. Interview by the Duke Univ. Office of News & Commc'ns with Steven L. Schwarcz,
Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Bus., Duke Univ., in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 24, 2008), available
at http://news.duke.edu/2008/09/braintrustip.html.
168. Id.
169. See Interview with Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note 167; see also Note, The Political
Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1502, 1503 (2002) (describing Franklin Roosevelt's Brain Trust as an informal think tank) (citing
JAMES ALLEN SMITH, THE IDEA BROKERS: THINK TANKS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW POLICY
ELITE 52, 54 (1991)).
170. Interview with Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note 167.
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